

TO: TOM REIFER
FROM: DAN ELLSBERG

Nuclear Weapons

kinds of arms
each other, cov-
weapons devel-
process will be
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which U.S. and
grams are likely
On both sides,"
to predict, bu-
great zest and
confrontational
ge' and 'cheat-

tensions is more
na than any other
petition. Nuclear
"emancipat[ed]
r thinking," and
mains locked into
ese countries by
nuclear arsenals"
sturbingly that

ent in this nu-
continue to
sions in the
relationship.
de modernizes
strategic forces.
l find reason to
ffs on each side
perform calcula-
e whether the
used to be The
omewhat launch
hout having to
and certain
Such Cold War
to persist, like a
ng after the con-
ted. (p. 25)

a growing body of
poses a Russian-
Community aimed
oint activities and
s and to "eradicate
frontation through-
ry establishments."
that "the nuclear
des will provide the

lever and the fulcrum to create a de-
fense community" (p. 29). He pro-
poses negotiations aimed at creating a
new nuclear balance "that would be
without its thousands of missiles,
primed to retaliate instantly against an
enemy first strike," and in which U.S.
and Russian nuclear forces "will co-
exist side by side—much like the
French and British nuclear forces—
without the adversarial concern about
the 'stability' of mutual deterrence"
(p. 30).

Iklé's ideas are similar to those
emerging from ongoing work by Sergei
Rogov and others at the Institute of
U.S.A. and Canada Studies in Moscow
and point the way to a deeper and
broader resolution of the Cold War
than would come from mere changes
in nuclear doctrine or cuts in numbers
(Rogov 1992). They are theoretically
compatible with any of the three
schools—Minimal, Moderate, or Max-
imal—outlined above. Iklé's point is
an important one: no matter what each
side does with its own nuclear forces,
building bridges between the two may
mean the difference between contin-
ued partnership and a new Cold War.
What is required now is a more de-
tailed study of what a nonadversarial
U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship
would look like.

For Once, A Hopeful Future

Already it is clear that the 1990s are to
be a fundamentally new period in the
nuclear era. It will be a time of un-
precedented reductions in numbers
and shifts in strategy. In this dynamic
era, the traditional schools of Maxi-
malism and Minimalism may not be
fully appropriate—as indeed neither
may have been even during the Cold
War. U.S. (and Russian) nuclear strat-
egists face fundamentally new chal-
lenges today: how to develop a nuclear

strategy for regional contingencies,
how low to allow their arsenals to fall
before halting the process of reduc-
tions, how to develop nuclear strate-
gies appropriate for a world without a
major, global threat. The current lit-
erature on nuclear strategy contains
many good suggestions. Yet some of
the crucial questions about deep cuts
and minimum deterrence, left unat-
tended for so long during the Cold
War, remain to be answered.

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